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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the attorney-client privilege has a long history in American and
common law, the issue of whether the privilege extends to government entities
and the attorneys who represent them remains controversial. In 2005, the Second
Circuit concluded that the privilege applies to attorney-client relationships in the
public sector, 1 a holding that directly conflicts with recent decisions in the
Seventh, 2 Eighth, 3 and D.C. Circuits. 4 These decisions have created uncertainty
for practitioners who represent government clients and have prompted considerable concern from professional organizations. In a recent ABA teleconference,
moderator Ross H. Garber called attorney-client privilege "one of, if not the most
important issue for government lawyers." 5
The traditional justification for the attorney-client privilege is instrumental: the
confidentiality guaranteed by the privilege is necessary to promote candor in
discussions between attorneys and their clients. Many commentators have
accepted this rationale unquestioningly. However, available empirical evidence is
equivocal at best. While I draw no firm conclusions about the validity of the
instrumental rationale generally, I do suggest that the rationale is less persuasive
for entity clients such as corporations. Moreover, for government entity clients,
any attempt to justify the privilege instrumentally must account for the
diminished expectation of confidentiality in the public sector as well as
democratic values disfavoring secrecy in government.
In this Note, I aim to demonstrate that the traditional instrumental rationale
cannot validate an absolute privilege with respect to government entity clients.
Although my analysis of the privilege in the government context will draw from
historical precedent and existing scholarly literature, I also hope to provide
further insight into the way the privilege functions in practice by grounding the
discussion in a series of twenty-five interviews with government attorneys that I

I. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005).
2. In reA Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F. 3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).
3. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
4. In re Bruce Lindsey, !58 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
5. See, e.g., Am. B. Ass'n, Ctr. For Continuing Legal Educ. Teleconf., Everyday Ethics for Government
Attorneys (Dec. 16, 2005) (recording on file with author).
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conducted between November 2005 and January 2006. 6
The Note will proceed in three parts. Part I provides the history of the
government attorney-client privilege, exploring its treatment in the model
evidentiary codes as well as the increasing attention it has received in the courts.
Part II explores the theoretical justification for the privilege in more depth and
examines the few attempts at empirical verification. Although conventional
wisdom holds that an absolute privilege is necessary to induce client candor, this
instrumental rationale is particularly dubious when the client is an entity rather
than an individual.
Part III turns to the privilege in the government entity context. Because
individual government officers exercise less control over the privilege than do
private individual clients, such officers have very different incentives for
disclosure in communications with attorneys. Moreover, the background regime
of open government provisions and the high degree of public scrutiny that most
governments receive foster a climate of openness that contrasts to the baseline
expectation of confidentiality prevalent in the private sector. Therefore, in many
cases, the privilege currently provides less assurance of secrecy in the public
sector. Nonetheless, when interviewed, most government attorneys stated that
their clients were not preoccupied with the possibility that attorney-client
communication might become public. Moreover, attorneys expressed that any
undetected marginal decrease in candor caused by the uncertainty of the privilege
did not prevent them from representing their clients effectively.
This evidence strongly suggests that an absolute privilege is not a necessity for
effective communication between government officials and attorneys, thereby
undermining the traditional instrumental rationale as a justification for the
privilege in the government context. While some degree of protection for
sensitive communications is still appropriate, it is also important to take into
account the government attorney's unique responsibility to serve the public
interest. I do not attempt to formulate the proper scope of the government
attorney-client privilege in this Note. However, courts should weigh the
important considerations of transparency and openness in government in
adapting the contours of the attorney-client privilege to the unique context of the
public sector.

II.

EVOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRiviLEGE IN THE
UNITED STATES

The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between
lawyers and those whom they represent. Many attorneys and commentators have
accepted, as a matter of course, that the attorney-client privilege extends to

6. See infra note 111 for a detailed discussion of my interview methodology.
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government entity clients. 7 Yet a closer examination of the history of the
privilege calls this assumption into question. This section traces the development
of the attorney-client privilege for government clients in the United States,
ultimately revealing only equivocal support for a conclusion that the privilege
functions similarly for government entities.
A. EARLY HISTORY

Only two courts confronted the government attorney-client privilege prior to
the 1960s, and both assumed with little analysis that it protected government
entities. 8 This lack of jurisprudence on the privilege resulted, at least in part, from
the provisions of the Federal Housekeeping Act, which enabled government
officials to prohibit government employees from testifying in court. 9 Following
the Act's amendment in 1958, however, government officers increasingly relied
on the attorney-client privilege to block the release of sensitive information.
In 1963, United States v. Anderson upheld the existence of the privilege with
little analysis, 10 casting its decision in broad terms that encouraged courts in
several subsequent cases to assume that the privilege applied to communications
between government attorneys and employees. 11 The lone objection arose in
United States v. Board ofTrade of Chicago, in which the United States attempted
to shield from discovery documents prepared for the Commodities Exchange
Authority by the Department of Agriculture's Office of General Counsel. 12 The
court dismissed previous decisions as "conclusory, unsupported, and unexplained," and asserted that "novel privileges should be grounded upon more
pertinent and persuasive precedent than this." 13 The court then found that the
attorney-client relationship in this particular government context was "more akin
to the functioning of a high-level corporate officer seeking the views of other
corporate division chiefs than to the traditional lawyer and client relationship." 14
Nonetheless, the Board of Trade decision failed to instigate more widespread
skepticism about the government attorney-client privilege.

7. PAUL R. RICE, I AITORNEY-CLIENT Pluvn.EGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:28 n.82 (2d ed. 1999) ("Most
courts have assumed, without analysis, that governmental entities can assert the attorney-client privilege.").
8. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448,450 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (noting that "the policy of the
privilege seems to me to provide no ground for the distinction" between public and private clients); Rowley v.
Ferguson, 48 N.E.2d 243,248 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) (assuming that "[t]he fact that both attorney and client were
public officials should make no difference").
9. R.S. § 161 (1875) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 822).
10. United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518 (D. Colo. 1963).
II. See, e.g., Thill Sec. Corp. v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133 (E.D. Wise. 1972); Detroit Screwmatic Co.
v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); General Electric Co. v. United States, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS
442 (Ct. CI. Sept. 19, 1972).
12. United States v. Bd. of Trade of Chicago, No. 71 C 2875, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11307 (N.D. lll. Oct. 30,
1973).
13. /d. at *8.
14. /d. at *9-10.
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The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 15 enacted in 1967, also critically
influenced the development of case law on the government attorney-client
privilege. When a party tries to assert the privilege during ordinary litigation,
courts tend to be skeptical because such action "deprives the court of relevant
evidence and may obstruct a just determination." 16 In the context of FOIA
requests, however, the case is often at an earlier stage and it is less clear whether
the documents will be of critical importance. 17 Consequently, courts decided in a
large number of cases that the attorney-client privilege was grounds for refusing a
FOIA request without the close scrutiny that they might have applied if the issue
of government attorney-client privilege arose in a different setting. 18
Thus, until the past decade or so, courts tended to accept the privilege without
substantial analysis, although some underlying skepticism lingered. As the court
in Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States noted, "[c]ourts have
generally accepted that the attorney-client privilege applies in the governmental
context, while expressing apprehension at its pernicious potential in a government top-heavy with lawyers." 19 But for the most part, courts alleviated any
residual anxiety by reference to the two evidentiary model codes.
B. THE MODEL EVIDENCE CODES

The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence were developed in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Proposed Rule 503, which would have codified the attorney-client
privilege, was drafted in 1969?0 At the time there were only five state and federal
opinions that, with little analysis, recognized the government attorney-client
privilege? 1 Despite the overall paucity of evidence, the drafters of Proposed Rule
503 defined the "client" who can assert a privilege as "a person, public officer, or
corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or

15. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
16. Melanie B. Leslie, Government Officials as Attorneys and Clients: Why Privilege the Privileged?, 77
IND. L.J. 469, 480 (2002).
17. See id. at 480-81.
18. See, e.g., BryanS. Gowdy, Note, Should the Federal Government Have an Attorney-Client Privilege?,
51 FLA. L. REv. 695, 710 (1999) (noting that many lower courts have cited NLRB v. Sears for the proposition
that the government is entitled to an attorney-client privilege, despite the fact that the Sears coun did not
explicitly hold that Exemption 5 to FOIA incorporated the attorney-client privilege). Others have argued that
FOIA is frequently employed by litigants or potential litigants seeking to gain information without following the
rules of discovery. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of lnfonnation Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils
and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 666-67 & n.76 (1984) (describing the
manipulation of FOIA to gain strategic advantage). This perception may have fostered courts' increased
willingness to defer to government claims of privilege in the FOIA context, and suggests that perhaps decisions
made in a FOIA context are distinguishable from the non-FOIA context.
19. 87 F.R.D. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
20. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 479.
21. See id. at 479 and n.57.
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private.'m Similarly, the Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 503 states
flatly that "[t]he definition of 'client' includes governmental bodies," citing
existing cases that themselves failed to examine whether the privilege should
apply to government attorneys.Z 3
Thus, like the courts that had previously considered the issue, the drafters of
Proposed Rule 503 did not explain their decision to extend the privilege to
government entities; as Professor Melanie Leslie observes, there is no record of
debate over the significance of this choice. 24 Nonetheless, courts soon began to
look to Proposed Rule 503 as authority on the scope of the attorney-client
privilege, and the rule continues to provide justification for the privilege in the
government context today. 25
Proposed Rule 503's conclusory justification for applying the attorney-client
privilege to government entities is particularly surprising given that the drafters
in the near-contemporaneous revision of the Uniform Rules of Evidence reached
a contradictory result. Uniform Rule 502, which addresses the attorney-client
privilege, states that public entities may not claim the attorney-client privilege
unless the "communication concerns a pending investigation, claim, or action
and the court determines that disclosure will seriously impair the ability of the
public officer or agency to process the claim or conduct a pending investigation,
litigation, or proceeding in the public interest. " 26 Although this formulation
substantially limits the privilege for government entities, the drafters of the
Uniform Rules also spent only minimal time discussing the rationale underlying
their construction of the privilege. Couched in general terms, this justification
relied primarily on the importance of open government. 27
After the two sets of evidentiary rules were finalized, most states adopted the
Proposed Federal Rules, including Proposed Rule 503, with its application of the
attorney-client privilege to government entities. However, four statesArkansas, Maine, North Dakota, and Oklahoma-did adopt the Uniform Rules of
Evidence version, with its substantially restricted version of the government
attorney-client privilege.Z 8 A few states also adopted the Uniform Rules but
excised the provision restricting the scope of the privilege, essentially making the

22. FED. R. Evm. 503(a)(l) (Proposed official draft 1969).
23. Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 503.
24. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 479.
25. See, e.g., Winton v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 188 F.R.D. 398, 400 (N.D. Okla. 1999) ("Proposed Rule 503
recognizes an attorney-client privilege for public entities and officers like the Defendants in this case. The Court
finds Rule 503's statement to be a sound reflection of the common law. Defendants may, therefore, exercise an
attorney-client privilege.").
26. UNIF. R. Evm. 502(d)(6).
27. Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting in Its Eighty-third Year, Nat' I Conf. ofComrn'rs on Unif.
St. Laws 57-58 (1974); Proceedings of the Annual Conference Meeting in Its Eighty-second Year, Nat' I Conf. of
Comrn'rs on Unif. St. Laws 74-75 (1973).
28. See ARK. CooEANN. § 16-41-101 (1987); ME. R. EVID. 502(d)(7); N.D. R. Evm. 502(d)(6); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(D)(6) (West 1993).
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privilege coextensive with Proposed Federal Rule 503?9 At least on the faces of
the relevant statutes, different states vary considerably in the way they treat the
government attorney-client privilege.
At the federal level, the Proposed Federal Rules relating to privileges,
including Proposed Rule 503, engendered considerable controversy. 30 Ultimately, Congress instead adopted a single rule, Rule 501, which allows the courts
to apply privileges using "principles of the common law.'m Despite this
instruction, the federal courts have accepted the Proposed Federal Rules as
evidence of common law practices surrounding the privilege, even though the
Proposed Federal Rules were never enacted. 32 Rule 501 also states that federal
privilege law applies except where state law supplies the rules of decision? 3
Nonetheless, "the Court has sometimes taken note of state privilege laws in
determining whether to retain them in the federal system.'' 34
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The history outlined in the previous sections suggests that conflicting ideas
about the proper scope of the government attorney-client privilege have existed,
albeit in obscurity, for several decades. The Watergate scandal could have
exposed this tension if communications between President Nixon and his legal
advisors had been put at issue. Instead, Nixon waived both the executive and
attorney-client privileges, leaving White House Counsel Fred Buzhardt free to
testify before the grand jury? 5 Similarly, Peter Wallison, White House Counsel
under President Reagan, produced his diary and assisted in other ways with the
Iran-Contra investigation. 36 Once again, the conflict remained a potentiality.
All this changed when the Office of the Independent Counsel launched a broad
investigation into the Clinton administration. The Whitewater investigation
resulted in a multitude of grand jury subpoenas, against which President
Clinton's legal defense unsuccessfully tried to claim the attorney-client privilege
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 37 and In re Bruce R. Lindsey? 8
In Subpoena Duces Tecum, the Eighth Circuit decided the issue of "whether an

29. See IDAHO R. EVID. 502; KY. R. Evm. 503; MISS. R. Evm. 502; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-2 to -5
(1994); TEx. R. EVID. 503; UTAH R. EVID. 504; VT. R. EVID. 502.
30. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 728 (2002).
31. FED. R. Evm. 501.
32. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
33. See id. at 368. For example, federal privilege law would apply in a federal grand jury investigation of a
state government official.
34. /d. at n.8.
35. SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, WATERGATE REPoRT 88 (1975), cited in In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d
1263, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
36. See Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1275.
37. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
38. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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entity of the federal government may use the attorney-client privilege to avoid
complying with a subpoena by a federal grand jury." 39 As part of the Whitewater
investigation, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr issued a grand jury subpoena
requiring disclosure of "documents created during meetings attended by any
attorney from the Office of Counsel to then-President Clinton and Hillary
Rodham Clinton (regardless of whether any other person was present)."40 The
White House (as the Eighth Circuit defined the party in interest in the case) cited
the attorney-client privilege as justification for its refusal to produce the
documents. 41
The Eighth Circuit distinguished the case's criminal context from the civil
context in which much of the case law on the government privilege had
developed, 42 also noting "the general principle that the government's need for
confidentiality may be subordinated to the needs of the government's own
criminal justice processes."43 The court then emphasized the significant public
interest concerns at stake:
We believe the strong public interest in honest government and in exposing
wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition of a
governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal proceedings
inquiring into the actions of public officials. We also believe that to allow any
part of the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against
the production of information relevant to a federal criminal investigation would
represent a gross misuse of public assets. 44

Although the court acknowledged that voiding the privilege in the criminal
context might create uncertainty that would make the privilege virtually useless,
it dismissed this objection by explaining, "confidentiality will suffer only in those
situations that a grand jury might later see fit to investigate. "45 Thus, the court
held that the privilege did not apply to the instant situation.
The following year, in 1998, the D.C. Circuit confronted an identical legal
issue in In re Bruce Lindsey, this time because Deputy White House Counsel
Bruce Lindsey declined to answer questions before a federal grand jury
investigating then-President Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 46 The

39. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 915.
40. /d. at 913.
41. /d. at 914.
42. /d. at 917-18.
43. /d. at 919.
44. /d. at 921.
45. /d. at 921. Various commentators have criticized this response as inadequate, noting that it is impossible
to tell in advance what situations a federal grand jury might later investigate. See, e.g., Todd A. Ellinwood, "In_
the Light of Reason and Experience": The Case for a Strong Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 2001 WIS.
L. REv. 1291, 1321 (2001) ("(T]he mere possibility of a criminal investigation will often be impossible to know
ex ante.").
46. In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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D.C. Circuit also held that the privilege did not provide a shield in the federal
grand jury context. Similar to the Eighth Circuit, the court based much of its
reasoning on "the public's interest in uncovering illegality among its elected and
appointed officials ... another protection of the public interest is through having
transparent and accountable government." 47
The D.C. Circuit also focused on 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), a federal statute requiring
that "[a]ny information ... received in a department or executive branch of the
Government relating to violations of title 18 involving Government officers and
employees shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General .... " 48
Although it is unclear whether the Office of the President, and thus the White
House Counsel, technically falls within the ambit of section 535(b), the court
found that the statute "evinces a strong congressional policy that executive
branch employees must report information" relating to criminal wrongdoing. 49
Thus, the D.C. Circuit found that this affirmative responsibility, coupled with the
public interest in disclosure of information, made the privilege inapplicable in the
federal grand jury context.
The Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit departed substantially from previous
case law and other authority in finding that the government's attorney-client
privilege receded in the context of a federal grand jury investigation. Not
surprisingly, these two cases attracted considerable attention in scholarly
literature, and both have drawn a fair amount of criticism, both for their departure
from precedent and for their purported partisanship. 5°
47. Id. at 1273.
48. 28 u.s.c. § 535(b) (2002).
49. Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1274, quoting In reSealed Case (Secret Service), 148 F.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
50. Prior to Subpoena Duces Tecum and Lindsay, the leading scholarly analysis of the government
attorney-client privilege was a Note arguing that the privilege should not be extended to government entities
because it "does not serve the privilege's underlying goals and conflicts with the principle of open government."
See Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727
(1988). In the aftermath of the Whitewater cases, some commentators have argued that the rationale for the
attorney-client privilege is equally compelling when the client is a government entity. See Ellinwood, supra note
45 (also contending that if a government official has committed a clear violation of the law, the government
attorney should advise the official to seek private counsel); Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense of the Government
Attorney-Client Privilege, 84 CoRNELL L. REv. 1682 (1999) (arguing that the privilege should apply except for
conversations related to personal issues, ongoing criminal investigations, or clearly criminal activity); Note,
Maintaining Confidence in Confidentiality: The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Government
Counsel, ll2 HARv. L. REv. 1995 (1999) (arguing that the government attorney-client privilege should apply
even in the federal grand jury context). Another Article has focused on the issue of who can waive the privilege
rather than the underlying policy reasons. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's
Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1998) (analogizing the United States government to a
corporation and concluding that the Independent Counsel should control the decision whether to assert the
attorney-client privilege). Other commentators have acknowledged that the government context differs from the
private sector in some respects, and that the privilege should be modified accordingly. See Amanda J.
Dickmann, In re Lindsey: A Needless Void in the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 33 IND. L. REv. 291
(1999) (acknowledging that a qualified privilege is appropriate in the face of a criminal investigation while
advocating in camera inspection to protect "military, diplomatic and sensitive national security secrets"); Leslie,
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Nonetheless, the idea of an abrogated government attorney-client privilege in
the context of a federal grand jury subpoena began to gain traction. In In re A
Witness before the Special Grand Jury, the Seventh Circuit adopted the reasoning
of the Eighth and D.C. Circuits in finding that the Chief Legal Counsel to the
Secretary of State's Office of Illinois could not invoke the privilege against a
federal grand jury subpoena. 5 1 The Seventh Circuit also cited the importance of
considering the public interest, explaining, "interpersonal relationships between
an attorney for the state and a government official acting in an official capacity
must be subordinated to the public interest in good and open government .... " 52
At least in criminal cases, courts appeared to have reached a consensus that the
government privilege should yield.
This illusion of agreement ended with the Second Circuit's decision in In re
Grand Jury Investigation. 5 3 Similar to the Seventh Circuit decision, In re Grand
Jury Investigation involved a grand jury subpoena issued to the former Chief
Legal Counsel to the Office of the Governor of Connecticut. 54 Unlike the Seventh
Circuit, the Second Circuit found that the privilege was absolute. The decision
relied partly on a Connecticut statute providing that "[i]n any civil or criminal
case or proceeding ... all confidential communications shall be privileged and a
government attorney shall not disclose any such communications unless an
authorized representative of the public agency consents to waive the privilege
and allow such disclosure." 55 However, the crux of the Second Circuit decision
was a belief that government officials must be able to rely on the privilege in
seeking legal advice. The court found that "if anything, the traditional rationale
for the privilege applies with special force in the government context,"56 also
noting that "[u]pholding the privilege furthers a culture in which consultation
with government lawyers is accepted as a normal, desirable, and even indispensable part of conducting public business."57 Similar to the Seventh, Eight, and
D.C. Circuits, the Second Circuit found that public interest considerations
compelled its decision on the government attorney-client privilege. But in stark
supra note 16, at 469 (arguing that a qualified privilege is sufficient because the privilege will have little impact
on government employees' decisions to confide in counsel); Walter Pincus, No Clear Legal Answer: The
Uncertain State of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 269 (2001) (suggesting a
balancing test coupled with in camera inspection to determine whether the privilege should hold). Although
most of the debate has focused on the privilege in the federal government context, a recent Comment also
specifically addressed the situation of a federal grand jury investigation of state government corruption. See Joel
D. Whitley, Comment, Protecting State Interests: Recognition of the State Government Attomey·Client
Privilege, 72 U. Cm. L. REv. 1533 (2005) (arguing that the public policy reasons for rejecting the attorney-client
privilege for federal government entities do not apply in the state government context).
51. In reA Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).
52. ld. at 294.
53. 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005).
54. ld. at 528.
55. ld. at 534, quoting CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 52-146r(b) (2005).
56. /d.
57. /d.
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contrast to the other circuits, the Second Circuit found that the public interest
justification actually compelled it to uphold the privilege, rather than to abrogate
it.
Thus, recent Second, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuit decisions on the
privilege demonstrate that the extent of the government attorney-client privilege
is unsettled, and will likely remain so until the issue is argued before the Supreme
Court. The importance of this privilege is underscored by Executive Order
13,233, issued by President George W. Bush in 2001. 58 Under previous law,
presidents could only assert the privilege for as long as they held office. 59
Executive Order 13,233 now decrees that presidents can continue to assert the
privilege even after they leave office. 60 Thus, the scope of the privilege has
gained even greater significance given that it can be wielded unilaterally not only
by current presidents, but also by former presidents, years or even decades after
they leave office, to control what information the public may access.
In less than fifty years, the government attorney-client privilege has evolved
from an ignored and virtually unused provision to a hotly-debated issue of
paramount importance to government officers' efforts to shield sensitive information from disclosure to the public. Courts and commentators continue to disagree
on the subject. Thus, because ready answers are unavailable, the remainder of this
Note will look to the underlying justification for the privilege and determine
whether it applies to the government context.

Ill. THE PRiviLEGE IN THE PRlvATE SECTOR
Evidentiary authorities generally agree that the most compelling rationale for
the attorney-client privilege is instrumental: the privilege facilitates "full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients," thereby promoting
"broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice."61 However, some evidence has called this justification into question by
casting doubt on whether the attorney-client privilege in fact facilitates candor.
In this section, I first outline the traditional instrumental rationale for the
privilege, then summarize the inconclusive empirical research on the subject. The

58. See Exec. Order 13,233, Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025
(Nov. l, 200 l) [hereinafter Presidential Records Act].
59. See Ira Berlin, Executive Order Undermines Democracy, 30 OAH NEWSLETI'ER (Org. of Am. Historians,
Bloomington, IN), May 13, 2002, http://www.oaii.org/pubs/nl/2002may/berlin.html (last visited Nov. 27,
2006).
60. See Presidential Records Act, supra note 58, § 2(a) ("[T]he former President or the incumbent President
may assert any constitutionally based privileges"; ''The President's constitutionally based privileges subsume
privileges for records that reflect: military, diplomatic, or national security secrets (the state secrets privilege);
communications of the President or his advisors (the presidential communications privilege); legal advice or
legal work (the attorney-client or attorney work product privileges); and the deliberative processes of the
President or his advisors (the deliberative process privilege).").
61. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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indeterminacy of this research prevents firm conclusions on the viability of the
instrumental rationale. Nonetheless, to the extent that the instrumental rationale
does justify an absolute privilege for individual clients, I suggest that the
justification is weaker for entity clients such as corporations.
A. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Most evidentiary rules focus on the courtroom behavior of witnesses,
attorneys, judges, and juries, and are designed to ensure that evidence introduced
in court is reliable and relevant to the matter at hand. 62 In contrast, the rules of
privilege are concerned with conduct that occurs in society at large. As
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman observed during the Congressional hearings
on the then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, "unlike most evidentiary rules,
privileges protect interpersonal relationships outside of the courtroom."63
These broader social implications of the privilege may explain why privileges
in general, and the attorney-client privilege in particular, have prompted so much
debate. Nineteenth century English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham
sharply criticized the attorney-client privilege, noting sarcastically that if the
privilege were revoked, "a guilty person will not in general be able to derive quite
so much assistance from his law advisor, in the way of concerting a false defense,
as he may do at present."64
Bentham's cynical view was disputed by evidentiary theorist Dean Wigmore,
who argued in favor of privileges on the grounds that they facilitate the search for
truth and hence ensure accurate judicial decision. 65 Wigmore's theory was that
certain communications "originate[] in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed"-in other words, but for the speaker's belief that a given statement
will remain secret, the statement would not be spoken in the first place. 66 Thus,
Wigmore believed the privilege would not result in a net loss to the information
available to a trier of fact, because it would shield only statements that would not
have been made in its absence. 67 Relatedly, Wigmore argued that, if a privilege
applied, it must be "absolute" in character. 68 Because secrecy was a necessary
precondition to disclosure, if the speaker felt that secrecy was assured only in

62. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions Underlying the Law of
Evidentiary Privileges: Insights from the Literature on Self-Disclosure, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 707, 707 (2004).
63. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 28 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7097.
64. Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale ofJudicial Evidence, in 7 THE WoRKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 473-75, 477,
479 (1827).
65. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (John T. McNaughton rev.,
1961).
66. ld. (emphasis omitted); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption
Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. PITT. L. REv. 145, 151 (2004)
(emphasis omitted).
67. See WIGMORE, supra note 65, § 2291.
68. ld.
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some circumstances, the disclosure still would be chilled.
Wigmore's treatise became the foremost authority on evidentiary rules, and his
view remains extremely influential today. 69 His conclusion that the privilege is
necessary to promote candid disclosure from a client to her attorney is deeply
ingrained in contemporary legal culture, and the view is so dominant that most
lawyers, let alone laypeople, never pause to question it.
A few scholars have advanced non-instrumental justifications for the attorneyclient privilege. 70 Professor Charles Fried argues that the privilege is necessary to
the fundamental value of client autonomy, claiming that it is "immoral for society
to constrain anyone from discovering what the limits of [the law's] power over
him are.'m Professor David Louisell grounds his justification for the privilege in
a concern for privacy, asserting that the inviolability of certain relationships is
"more important to human liberty than accurate adjudication." 72 Expressing a
similar concern for human relationships, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur
Goldberg once asserted that privileges such as the attorney-client privilege
"relate to the fundamental rights of citizens.'m Finally, Professor Charles
McCormick argues that
[o]ur adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of fighter for the
party whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the
relationship, and this sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to change our
customs so as to make the lawyer amenable to routine examination upon the
client's confidential disclosures regarding personal business? 4

The primary response to these arguments is that attorney-client relationships do
not deserve greater protection than the many other relationships in which
disclosures frequently occur. 75 Thus, although these more conceptual theories
have received some attention, Wigmore's emphasis on promoting candor has
retained primacy.
Despite the dominance of the instrumental rationale, our legal culture still

69. See Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 708-09.
70. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 484-85. I am indebted to Melanie Leslie's work for gathering the sources in
this paragraph.
71. Charles Fried, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 573,586 (1977).
72. David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31
TuL. L. REv. 101, 110 (1956).
73. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before Special Subcomm on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. 142, 143-44 (1973) (testimony of Justice Arthur J. Goldberg).
74. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 87, at 205-206 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3rd
ed. 1984).
75. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 16, at 484 & n. 84. Moreover, to the extent that these non-instrumental
justifications have some relevance for an individual client, they are less persuasive for organizational clients
such as corporations or governments. For example, Fried's autonomy argument and Louisell's concern for
privacy and liberty carry far more weight when the rights of an individual human are at stake; it is more difficult
to argue that a corporation's interest in "liberty" justifies an absolute protection of its officers' communications
with counsel.
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reflects a latent discomfort with the privilege. As the Court acknowledged in
United States v. Nixon, "[privileges] are designed to protect weighty and
legitimate competing interests ... [and] are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. " 76 This account of the
privilege lies in tension with the instrumental rationale: if Wigmore is right that
the privilege only protects communications that would not have been made in its
absence, then application of the privilege would not really represent any such
derogation.
In light of this underlying discomfort, it is important to remember that some of
the assumptions underlying Wigmore's theory about privilege have never been
empirically verified. Most importantly, it has never been established that the
privilege is actually necessary to facilitate client candor. The following section
will explore this assumption in more detail in relation to particular types of
attorney-client relationships.
B. IMPLEMENTATION IN PRACTICE

The strength of the instrumental rationale for the attorney-client privilege
varies depending on the identity of the client. This section will suggest that the
theoretical argument that the privilege facilitates candor is strongest when the
client is an individual, and is less compelling when the client is an entity such as a
corporation. Available empirical evidence relating to the instrumental rationale
does not support any firm conclusions: only a few studies have been conducted,
and even the most well-designed research construct can only imperfectly
simulate the calculus that takes place when an actual client weighs whether to
disclose information to her attorney. Still, for both individual and entity clients,
available research suggests that the relationship between confidentiality and
candor is less definitive than popularly assumed. Although only further research
can resolve this question, both theoretical arguments and available empirical
evidence suggest that some skepticism with regard to the instrumental rationale is
warranted, particularly in the context of entity clients.
1.

REPRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUALS

In 1962, Yale Law School published the results of a study in which 108
laypersons and 125lawyers filled out questionnaires regarding the importance of
confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship. 77 The study found that many
subjects believed that an attorney would have to divulge confidential information
in some situations, suggesting that for these people absolute confidentiality was

76. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,709-10 (1974).
77. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962).
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not a prereqmstte for candid communication. Thirty percent of layperson
participants (32 of 108) erroneously believed that attorneys have a legal
obligation to reveal client confidences if asked to do so by a lawyer in court, and
nearly 20% (21 of 108) stated that they did not know for sure?8 In general,
laypersons were somewhat more divided on the effect of the privilege than were
attorneys. While 72% of attorneys (90 of 125) believed that the privilege helped
induce disclosure, about half of laypersons said they would be "less likely to
make free and complete disclosure" without the privilege. 79 Finally, only 45% of
laypersons (49 of 108) affirmatively believed that attorneys should not reveal
confidential information if asked to do so in court. 80
The Yale study permits only tentative conclusions. It was conducted by a legal
periodical over forty years ago, and it is difficult to evaluate some of the data
because lawyers and laypersons were asked different sets of questions. Nevertheless, certain results do suggest that an absolute privilege is not necessary to
induce candor. As Fred Zacharias has explained, its findings imply that, "while a
preference for nondisclosure rules exists, a substantial majority of laypersons
would continue to use lawyers even if secrecy were limited." 81
Zacharias attempted to replicate the Yale study in the late 1980s, finding that
the relationship between the guarantee of confidentiality and the client's
willingness to disclose was less symmetrical and more complex than Wigmore
assumed. 82 Although nearly 30% of subjects who had previously consulted
lawyers on various matters stated that they had shared information that they
would have been unwilling to disclose without a guarantee of confidentiality, 83 as
Zacharias observes, there are a number of possible explanations for this result. 84
Rather than relying on the promise of confidentiality per se, the clients may have
viewed confidentiality as important "because they view lawyers as honorable
professionals who customarily promise discretion .... " 85 In other words,
participants may have viewed the guarantee of confidentiality as an indicator of a

78. !d. at 1261 (FormA- Laymen- Question 5).
79. /d. at 1232 n.38, 1262, 1270 (Form A- Laymen- Question 6; Form C- Lawyers- Question 5). The
conclusions that can be drawn here are limited because the question did not measure the extent of the privilege's
effect on disclosure. For example, we have no way of knowing whether the attorneys believed that the privilege
had a significant impact on disclosure or only a small impact, or whether laypersons would be significantly less
likely to make free and complete disclosure, or only slightly less likely.
80. !d. at 1262 (Form A- Laymen- Question 7).
81. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REv. 351, 378 (1989).
82. See id.
83. /d. at 381. Half of all subjects (including those who had consulted lawyers previously as well as those
who had not) predicted that they would withhold information from attorneys if no firm obligation of
confidentiality existed. /d. at 380.
84. !d. at 380.
85. !d. at 381. This hypothesis is bolstered by a question that asked clients whether they would withhold
information if the lawyer "promised confidentiality except for specific types of information which he/she
described in advance": only 15.1% of clients stated that they would withhold information in such a situation. /d.
at 386.
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lawyer's competence rather than as a promise of absolute secrecy.
Other parts of the survey lend weight to Zacharias' inference. One suggestive
portion asked subjects whether lawyers should disclose privileged information in
morally compelling situations where the current privilege rules nonetheless
clearly forbid disclosure. 86 In nearly all cases, a substantial majority of subjects
concluded that a lawyer should disclose the privileged information. 87 Moreover,
the fact that lawyers could disclose information in certain situations did not
appear to impact subjects' willingness to consult with attorneys: in each of twelve
hypotheticals, less than 25% of subjects indicated that they would be less willing
to consult a lawyer if such disclosure was allowed. 88 Thus, the Zacharias study
also suggests that absolute confidentiality may not be necessary for individual
clients to be willing to communicate candidly with their lawyers.
Commentators have raised other questions about the need for confidentiality.
One theorizes that laypersons generally "engage in a balancing process" in
deciding whether to share information, weighing the "rewards, benefits, or utility
of disclosure." 89 Yet this does not necessarily support the need for the privilege,
because we cannot "assume[ ] that the layperson is acting rationally at the time of
the decision whether to disclose." 9° For example, the client may be overly
influenced by his own emotional reactions, or may have a "diverse variety of
conflicting, contradictory goals" that militate in opposite directions with respect
to disclosure. 91 Another commentator has argued that the privilege provides a
critical incentive for many criminal defendants, who are likely to be unfamiliar
with the applicable law and who may withhold facts important to their defense
unless confidentiality is assured, but that in other circumstances the privilege is
far less compelling. 92 Finally, several researchers have reported significant
variations in self-disclosure patterns among individuals93-thus, even if some
people do require the privilege to reveal information, it may not be a necessary
precondition for the majority. 94
The available data simply do not provide a clear answer to the question of
86 Typical scenarios involved privileged information regarding the whereabouts of a kidnapping victim or
the innocence of a person falsely accused of a crime./d. at 409.
87. /d. at 395.
88. ld.
89. Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 718.
90. /d. at 719.
91. /d. at 719-20.
92. Leslie, supra note 16, at 483. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination absolves
the client-defendant of the obligation to "reveal compromising facts to his adversary." /d. In contrast, the
discovery rules in civil litigation require disclosure of every relevant fact, so even information that the client
would rather keep secret is often bound to come out during discovery.
93. Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 720-21.
94. Of course, even if a small but significant minority of people requires an absolute privilege for disclosure,
this might provide sufficient justification for such a privilege. Certainly this argument holds some sway in the
individual context, but in the government context, we must balance these considerations against the competing
values of transparency and openness that will be discussed more thoroughly in Part ill.
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whether the attorney-client privilege is a requirement for candid communication
between individual clients and their lawyers. Yet existing research does suggest
that the necessity of confidentiality is an open question even for these clients, for
whom the instrumental rationale is at its most robust. The next section will
discuss the even stronger cause for skepticism about the instrumental justification
in the corporate context.
2.

REPRESENTATION OF CORPORATIONS

Courts have consistently held that the attorney-client privilege applies in
situations where the client is a corporate entity. 95 The seminal case is Upjohn Co.
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court not only held that the privilege
extends to corporations, but also affirmed that the privilege covers communications between an attorney and any employee representing the corporation, rather
than merely those involving a "control group" consisting of upper management.96
Following Upjohn, the corporate attorney-client privilege is firmly entrenched
in legal doctrine. Nonetheless, applying the attorney-client privilege to the
corporate context adds a new layer of conceptual difficulty. 97 People generally
advance the same instrumental rationale as for individual clients-"to encourage
more open and candid communication from those who personify the corporation
in order that attorneys can render more informed advice to the corporation."98
Importantly, however, the privilege extends only to the corporate entity, not to its
individual employees. 99
This limitation results in a misalignment of interests. Because individual
corporate employees are not protected by the privilege, they may lack incentive
to disclose information regardless of whether the privilege applies to the
corporation as a whole. Corporate counsel is likely to share information reported
by an individual employee with at least the upper management of the corporation.
Thus, as Leslie suggests, an employee may hesitate to reveal information that
looks bad for herself or for the corporation, either because she fears reprisal from
her employer or because she fears more general damage to her reputation. 100

95. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915).
96. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981).
97. As Paul Rice, aulhor of lhe leading treatise on lhe attorney-client privilege, explains, "lhe very existence
of lhe [corporate] privilege is based on intuition, instinct, assumption, and hunches about lhe conduct of
individuals." RICE, supra note 7, § 4:10; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 217-34 (1988)
(suggesting lhat attorney-client privilege should be abolished when the client is an organization ralher than a
natural person).
98. RICE, supra note 7, § 4:21.
99. /d. at 96. It is also important to keep in mind lhat lhe corporation's attorney-client privilege "does not
personally protect lhe agents, even lhough lhey may have incurred personal liability from lhe actions on behalf
of the corporation." /d. at 97, citing United States v. Aramony, 88 F. 3d 1369, 1388-92 (4th Cir. 1996).
100. Leslie, supra note 16, at 493.
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This concern is particularly salient because the employee has no personal
control over the privilege: when the client is a corporate entity, only the board of
directors has the power to waive or assert the privilege. 101 Should the board
decide to waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation, the individual
employee has no means of resisting, even if the information revealed is
personally damaging. 102 Even for relatively high-ranking employees who do
exercise some control over the privilege, the possibility that information will be
shared with other high-ranking employees may create a disincentive to reveal
information. 103
The only existing empirical study of the corporate attorney-client privilege,
conducted in the 1980s, also suggested that the existence of a privilege does not
determine high-ranking employees' decisions to disclose. 104 In interviews,
corporate executives did cite the privilege as one factor in their decision to
confide information, but the most important factor was their trust in the particular
attorney. 105 If the privilege were tailored to allow disclosure in some situations,
the survey suggested that there would be little chill on most communications,
although at the margin it might decrease candor among upper-level executives,
particularly with respect to written communications. 106
Professor Paul Rice speculates that economic incentives may nonetheless
provide justification for the attorney-client privilege. He explains, "Because of
the privilege's guaranteed protection to the corporation, the corporation's
hierarchy will be more willing to exercise the economic power over its
employees and order them to communicate with counsel. The threat of sanction
will often influence employees to relate facts that are adverse to themselves." 107
Although this seems reasonable in theory, it is more challenging to envision how
it would play out in practice. To wield the threat of sanction effectively, upper
management would have to be aware that the recalcitrant employee knew
something important. Moreover, the sanction the corporation threatened would
have to be more severe than the consequences the employee feared from
disclosure. Surely these conditions would occur in only a subset of cases.
Rice also makes the argument that employees may decide to be candid simply
because "the interests of both the individual employees and the corporate client
101. See RICE, supra note 7, § 4:21.
102. Leslie, supra note 16, at 493.
103. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 166-73. For example, Thornburg points out that an employee may be
concerned that other employees will waive the privilege with respect to his communication by disclosing the
communication to non-privileged individuals. See id. at 166-73. Even if the disclosure remains within the
company, a high-ranking officer may wish to avoid remonstrations from his colleagues.
104. Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 191 (1989). The study did not examine the impact of the privilege on rank-and-file employees.
105. /d. at 277. It is worth noting that trust in an attorney might be fostered by the existence of the privilege.
106. /d. at 264, 371, 374.
107. RICE, supra note 7, § 4:21.
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often coincide" and thus the assertion of the privilege "usually enures to the
benefit of its employees." 108 Certainly this unity of interests can occur, although
it is less certain whether it affects employees' disclosure calculations, particularly
at the early stages of an investigation when it is unclear whether their interests
will be aligned with those of the corporation.
Notwithstanding Rice's arguments, it is generally uncertain to what extent the
privilege actually encourages rank-and-file employees to communicate more
candidly with corporate counsel. For upper-level management, Leslie theorizes
that the attorney-client privilege may provide some incentive to be more
forthcoming. 109 Such executives' personal interests are more likely to be aligned
with those of the corporation, and they may also have more influence over
whether the corporation as a whole waives the privilege.uo Yet Leslie also
expresses skepticism as to whether the eventual outcome is desirable: even if the
privilege "affects the candor of upper management at the margins ... it often
does so in service of dubious ends,"u 1 perhaps by allowing executives to conceal
their own wrongdoing from shareholders and the public.
In sum, the instrumental rationale is less compelling in the corporate context
than in the individual context. For rank-and-file employees, lack of control over
the privilege and fear that inculpatory information will be disclosed to their
supervisors means that the privilege will likely provide little additional incentive
for frank communication. For upper-level management, on the other hand, the
attorney-client privilege may facilitate candor in some situations.
Ultimately, I do not seek to undermine the instrumental rationale in the context
of the private sector. However, I do wish to question the extent to which we
accept this rationale for the privilege in all circumstances. The corporate entity
privilege, in particular, raises problems with the instrumental rationale that
resonate even more powerfully in the government context.

IV. THE PRIVILEGE IN THE PuBLIC SECTOR
This Part will discuss the attorney-client privilege as it applies to government
entity clients. To contextualize the theoretical conclusions that courts and
commentators have advanced, I will also present the findings of a series of
interviews that I conducted with attorneys who represent state and municipal
governments. u 2

108. /d.
109. Leslie, supra note 16, at 494.
llO. /d.
Ill. /d.
ll2. The interviews were conducted during the two-and-a-half months between November 15, 2005, and
January 31, 2006. The bulk of my interviews were with attorneys who worked for state attorney generals'
offices. I conducted twenty such interviews with attorneys in twenty different states. I also conducted five
interviews with attorneys who represented municipalities. To locate government attorneys willing to be

182

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 20: 163

Realities of government practice render the instrumental rationale unpersuasive in the public sector. Like corporate employees, most government employees
do not exercise individual control over the privilege. Moreover, government
employees are subject to open government provisions and extraneous media and
political pressures that considerably diminish their expectation of confidentiality.
Despite this background, government attorneys report that their clients communicate with sufficient candor to allow adequate representation. Thus, although
confidentiality may provide a meaningful incentive for communication in some
cases, it does not have to take the form of an absolute privilege that guarantees
total secrecy.
Because instrumental necessity does not justify an absolute privilege, the
unique responsibilities of public sector practice can help to determine a more
appropriate tailoring. The government attorney has a duty to promote the public
interest, and, as many commentators have recognized, the important democratic
values of transparency and openness in government bear substantially on this
interest. I do not attempt the complex task of delineating the privilege in this
Note. However, in light of the government attorney's unique responsibility to the
public, courts should weigh the importance of open government heavily as they
determine the scope of the privilege for government entities.
A. A CLIMATE OF OPENNESS

The attorney-client privilege operates against a backdrop of other provisions
designed to promote openness in government. Every state has FOIA provisions

interviewed, I either called a general telephone number or sent an email to a general email address for a
government entity. The attorneys I contacted were exceedingly generous with their time; several discussions
exceeded an hour in length.
I acknowledge the limitations of my research. First, the interviews were not standardized: although I
attempted to cover the same set of issues in each interview, the order and phrasing of my questions varied
somewhat depending on my interviewee's responses. Thus, the information I gleaned may be used for only the
broadest of quantitative comparisons; any more specific analysis is likely to be deceptive. My sample of
attorneys was also non-representative. Although I attempted a degree of randomization by contacting the
general number or email address for government counsel, the attorneys with whom I eventually spoke cannot be
described as a random sample. They may have agreed to speak with me due to their specific experience with the
privilege, their seniority in the office, their familiarity with ethics issues, or simply their lighter workload.
Finally, there might of course be a discrepancy between what attorneys say about the privilege to an interviewer
and what they actually do on a daily basis.
Despite these obvious shortcomings, I felt that the interview methodology I employed was appropriate to a
nuanced and complex issue such as the attorney-client privilege. Objective questionnaires would have allowed
greater standardization and more potential for quantitative analysis, but also might have encouraged attorneys to
craft cautious, lawyerly responses. The interviews also frequently yielded interesting information that a
questionnaire would not have uncovered because I would not have asked about it.
To facilitate discussion I assured all attorneys that information they shared with me would be kept
confidential, and that they would not be identified by state, agency, or name. The source for each quotation in the
Note has been anonymized, and all identifying information has been redacted. Several attorneys requested
copies of my written product for their records, which I provided upon completion.
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and other public records acts, which are designed to allow public access to
virtually all government documents that do not fall within a recognized
exception. Many jurisdictions also have some version of an open meetings act,
which allows public attendance at any meeting between government officers
unless a recognized exception applies. Paul Rice has observed that the extent of
open government laws in seven states abolishes the government attorney-client
privilege altogether; 113 other states provide only a limited exception for
attorney-client communications concerning pending claims or litigation. 114
Moreover, Rice notes, "there have so far been no reported adverse consequences
from this action." 115 These open government provisions have shaped the
expectations of the government employees they regulate. As one state attorney I
interviewed explained, "people in state government are used to operating under
public scrutiny and being very candid." 116
As discussed in Part I.B, a few states also have adopted the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, with its provision that the attorney-client privilege does not apply
unless the communication is in preparation for litigation or some other
proceeding. 117 Attorneys I spoke to from these states differed in their assessment
of how this evidentiary provision played out in practice: one stated that "for all
practical purposes, we treat it as though there is no privilege," 118 while another
hesitated before commenting, "I think most people don't actually know about the
exception. It hasn't come up." 119 Still, at least in those states where attorneys are
aware of the limitations on the privilege, it seems there is little expectation of
confidentiality.
Uncertainty as to who controls the privilege also reduces the expectation of
confidentiality. Ordinarily only the client can waive the privilege, 120 but in the
government context, the client might be viewed as the individual officer, the
agency, the executive branch, the government as a whole, or even the citizens of
the state or municipality. 121 In some cases, the identity of the client may vary
depending on the structure of the government entity and the nature of the matter

113. See Paul R. Rice, The Government's Attorney-Client Privilege: Should It Have One?, PuB. CoUNs.
NEWSLETTER, (Md. St. B. Ass'n, Baltimore, MD), http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/acgov.md.htm.
114. Leslie, supra note 16, at 504-5.
115. Rice, supra note 113.
116. Telephone Interview with State Attorney ("SA") #4 (Nov. 30, 2005).
117. See supra Part I.B.
118. Telephone Interview with SA #1 (Nov. 22, 2005).
119. Telephone Interview with SA #2 (Nov. 29, 2005).
120. FED. R. EVID. 503(b) (Proposed official draft 1969).
121. See Paulsen, supra note 50, at 487-92 (analyzing this question in the federal context and concluding that
the "client" of an attorney working in the White House Counsel's office is the government as a whole); see also
MODEL RULES OF PRoF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt.9 (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("Although in some
circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive
branch, or the government as a whole.").
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at hand. 122 Many attorneys I interviewed agreed that the client's identity is fluid;
one state attorney recalled "a time when I spent an hour and a half speaking with
our antitrust attorneys to figure out who the client was." 123
Although such difficult questions of client identity do arise, the default
presumption is that the agency is the client. As the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers states, "For many purposes, the preferable approach ...
is to regard the respective agencies as the clients and to regard the lawyers
working for the agencies as subject to the direction of those officers authorized to
act in the matter involved in the representation." 124 In practice, most state
attorneys adopted this presumption, agreeing that the agency was the client for
the majority of the matters they handled, while municipal attorneys viewed the
city council as their client.
The fact that the client is usually an entity creates some of the same difficulties
as it does in the corporate context: because the agency itself cannot control the
privilege, it is unclear which employees can act on its behalf to waive or assert the
privilege. In practice, the agency head seems to control the privilege in most
states, although again this has not been tested extensively in the courts. A few
state attorneys also thought that the governor might have input into whether to
waive or maintain the privilege. 125 Others guessed that the governor could waive
the privilege over the agency head's objections, but added that this had never
occurred. 126 At least one state has a "control group" test, in which only one of a
select few high-ranking agency officers can assert the privilege. 127 In the
municipal setting, the two attorneys I spoke with agreed that the privilege could
be waived by a vote of the majority of the city council.
The important point is that in most cases an individual government employee
exercises little or no control over the waiver of the privilege. If an agency
employee discloses sensitive information to a government attorney, the head of

122. See, e.g., REsTA1EMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (2000) ("No universal
definition of the client of a governmental lawyer is possible .... Those who speak for the governmental client
may differ from one representation to another. The identity of the client may also vary depending on the purpose
for which the question of identity is posed.").
123. Telephone Interview with SA#17 (Jan. 20, 2005).
124. REsTA1EMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNiNG LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c; see also United States v. AT&T,
86 F.R.D. 603, 617 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that, while the identity of the government attorney's client is unclear,
it "clearly includes the attorney's own agency"); Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who is the Client of the Government
Lawyer?, in EnncAL STANDARDS IN THE PuBuc SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, CLiENTS, AND
PuBuc OFFICiALS 13, 24 (Patricia Salkin ed., 1999) ("[T]he government lawyer is ethically bound to represent
the agency by whom he or she is employed .... ").
125. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA# 3 (Nov. 29, 2005).
126. Telephone Interview with SA#7 (Dec. 5, 2005). But see, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA #10 (Dec. 9,
2005) ("My first reaction is that, although the agency head is appointed by the governor, the advice is to the
agency, not to the governor.").
127. Telephone Interview with SA #6 (Dec. 5, 2005). Interestingly, this test seems very similar to the one
rejected by the Court in the corporate context in Upjohn. See United States v. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383, 390-92
(1981).
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the agency can later waive the privilege over the employee's objection. Relatedly,
the attorney has an ethical responsibility to tell the head of the agency when an
employee reveals information of potential legal concern. 128 Thus, for most
employees, there is little certainty of confidentiality even to the extent that the
privilege exists in their particular jurisdiction.
The possibility of waiver might provide little disincentive for communication
if employees felt reasonably sure that their superiors would not waive the
privilege. Yet this certainty does not seem to exist in practice: many attorneys
attested to substantial media and political pressures that often prompted waiver of
the privilege even if a government entity was legally entitled to assert it. As one
state attorney explained:
There's nothing in the Open Records Act that was intended to obviate the
attorney-client privilege. But there are pressures from the media if they are
running their stories and they want to know something right away. The
presumption is that something will be released unless it falls within a
recognized exception. And sometimes, even if something would be privileged,
a client will release it because there is political pressure. A lot of times the client
doesn't want to incur the wrath of the public .... quite frankly, after you get
hammered in the headlines for several days, the attorney-client privilege
becomes secondary. 129

Other attorneys agreed that asserting the privilege required a certain expenditure
of political capital that sometimes was not worth the benefit it yielded. One
explained, "We usually approach it as practically as possible ... we may advise
people just to waive it. The state doesn't want to be in the position of hiding the
ball."t3o
The realities of government operation provide important context for an
examination of the government attorney-client privilege. In many localities,
128. See MODEL RULES R. 1.13(b) (explaining that when a lawyer knows that there has been a legal violation
by a member of an organization, "the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization
as determined by applicable law"); Leslie, supra note 16, at 506; Barsdate, supra note 50, at 1379. Federal law
also requires executive branch employees to report criminal wrongdoing by other employees to the Attorney
General. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (2002).
129. Telephone Interview with SA #6 (Dec. 5, 2005). The same attorney also mentioned that with the short
deadline set by the state's Open Records Act, media pressure sometimes even made it difficult to review all
requested documents prior to release. See Telephone Interview with SA #17 (Jan. 20, 2006) ("I dealt with
[media pressure] in a situation involving the regulation of charities, where the attorney general is the client
because there is no separate agency that regulates it. So we went ahead and opened up all the files on a matter,
and decided not to assert the privilege, although we could have."); Telephone Interview with SA #11 (Dec. 13,
2005) ("In representing one of our state agencies, you have to be cognizant of the fact that whatever we do, the
agreement will eventually be public. Whereas in the private sector you're not going to have Joe Public knocking
on the door.").
130. Telephone Interview with SA #7 (Dec. 5, 2005); see also Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29,
2001) ("We might be encouraging our clients to waive the privilege as a matter of public policy. As a practical
matter, political pressure might make waiving the privilege the best thing to do.").
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officials are already accustomed to substantial public scrutiny of their actions as a
result of various open government provisions. Sometimes such provisions
effectively moot the privilege altogether. Moreover, even in governments where
the privilege continues to have teeth, government officers are not guaranteed
confidentiality. Because a high-ranking official-in most cases, either the agency
head or the governor--controls the privilege, the individual employee has no
direct control over its waiver. At the local government level, because the city
council as a whole decides to waive the privilege by majority vote, an individual
council member also lacks absolute control over the waiver of the privilege.
Particularly given that external pressure from the media or other groups may
make disclosure of privileged information politically prudent even where not
legally compelled, most officers are not in a position to rely on the privilege to
shield their communications.
The highest-ranking officials, such as agency heads, exert more direct control
over the waiver of privilege. However, open government provisions still apply to
at least some of their communications. Moreover, media scrutiny is likely to be
much greater for high-ranking officials, leading to situations where the most
prudent course of action is to release the communications. Even when an agency
head wishes to assert the privilege, she may face significant pressure from other
high-ranking officers to waive the privilege. Moreover, because the privilege
extends to the office or agency rather than the individual, even if a high-ranking
official decides to assert the privilege, her successor may later decide to waive the
privilege and make the communication public. 131 Other provisions, such as the
deliberative process privilege, may provide greater protection for the communications of high-ranking officials than for low-to-mid-level government employees. 132 Still, at least with respect to the attorney-client privilege, even these
high-ranking officers are not wholly immune to the climate of openness that
permeates government, and cannot presume that their communications with their
attorneys will never become public.
B. INSTRUMENTAL CONCERNS

The climate of openness present in government provides a backdrop for

131. See Rosenthal, supra note 124, at 26 ("Should the agency head resign or otherwise terminate service
and be replaced with a different individual, it is the new agency head that speaks on behalf of the agency and
thus will be able to assert or waive the privilege."); Leslie, supra note 16, at 518 & n.230. Although this issue
has never been litigated explicitly in the government context, the Supreme Court has recognized the right of a
successor in interest to waive the privilege in the context of other entities. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 356 (1985) (holding that a corporation's bankruptcy trustees can waive the
privilege over the objection of the corporation's directors).
132. For example, some commentary has suggested some doubt as to whether the deliberative process
privilege extends to lower-level officials. See Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process
Privilege, 54 Mo. L. REv. 279, 299 (1989). The deliberative process privilege is discussed in more detail infra
note 142.
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questioning the viability of the instrumental rationale in the government context.
Many commentators have simply assumed that a weak attorney-client privilege
in the government context would lead to an unacceptable chilling of communication between government officers and their attorneys. 133 Evidence given to
support this generalization generally takes the form of stylized hypotheticals or
citations to other commentators. 134
However, interviews with attorneys who represent government officers
suggest that these prevailing assumptions do not necessarily hold true. Although
attorneys reported that government officers sometimes expressed a general
concern for confidentiality, the existence of an absolute privilege was not
determinative in the decision to disclose information. Many attorneys regarded
the privilege as qualified, nonexistent under applicable laws, or uncertain due to
other considerations, yet the officers they represented continued to communicate
with apparent candor. More importantly, attorneys uniformly reported that
regardless of any undetected chilling effect, they were still able to provide
adequate representation for their clients. Ultimately, the lack of a serious
impediment to communication and the continued ability of government attorneys
to represent their clients indicate that the instrumental concerns provide
insufficient justification for an absolute government attorney-client privilege.
1.

CANDOR

As explained above, the attorney-client privilege provides a less-than-absolute
guarantee of secrecy for government employees. However, it is uncertain
whether this diminished confidentiality actually reduces government employees'
willingness to confide in counsel. Conversations with government counsel
suggest that government employees are aware of the privilege, but it is not their
central focus. The degree of concern for the privilege varies considerably from
one government entity to another and from one government employee to the next.
In some cases, government officers were attentive to the privilege. One
attorney, who also noted that the media was particularly active in his state, said
that "not a week goes by that one of my clients doesn't say, hey [name redacted],
do we have that attorney-client privilege confidentiality thing. So they are acutely

133. See, e.g., Dickmann, supra note 50, at 307-08 ("'Chilling' effects on full and frank communications will
inevitably occur."); Ellinwood, supra note 45, at 1321, 1325 ("If the sanctity of the privilege is not assured ex
ante, a chilling effect on client communication will result."; "The fact that there will be a chilling effect is
evident ...."); Chud, supra note 50, at 1690 ("[T]he client would not necessarily have divulged the information
to the court absent the protection offered by the attorney-client privilege."); Note, supra note 50, at 2012
("[O]nly through the preservation of the certainty and scope of the attorney-client privilege, whether in the
private or governmental context, can society promote the full and frank communication essential to the
provision of complete and effective legal advice."); Whitley, supra note 50, at 1535-37 ("[T]he attorney-client
privilege furthers public policy by encouraging client disclosure ....").
134. See, e.g., Dickmann, supra note 50, at 307-08; Ellinwood, supra note 45, at 1320-21; Whitley, supra
note 50, at 1537.
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aware of it, and they ask about it continually." 135 Another attorney acknowledged, "Sometimes when I'm talking to a client people will ask if this is
privileged. Not because they did something illegal or something, but just because
they want to understand the ground rules." 136
Other attorneys felt that concern about the privilege varied from one client to
the next. An attorney who represented an agency of several hundred people
explained, "Some people, they have a red file folder marked privilege, and
anything from me automatically goes in there. Others, it just gets buried, and they
are not really aware of it." 137 Attorneys also commented that an employee's
amount of public sector experience sometimes factored into their concern for the
privilege. One stated, "We don't talk about it a lot .... It's because we have a lot
of repetitive clients. So they already know how the privilege works. Sometimes
we get someone who we haven't worked with before, and they will say to me, ifl
tell you something, is it privileged?" 138 Another agreed, "Newer people to
government tend to ask about it more." 139
Finally, a significant group of attorneys stated that their clients were not
concerned with the privilege. One explained, "My experience has been, at least
with the agencies I've dealt with, they don't give a lot of thought to the
attorney-client privilege. Sometimes I do have an agency head say, 'I'm telling
you this as an attorney,' even if they may not know exactly what that means." 140
A twenty-year veteran of a state attorney general's office agreed: "In my
experience, there hasn't been much said about it in normal day-to-day representation."141 To some extent, the lack of concern for the attorney-client privilege may
have been due to other confidentiality provisions that exist in some jurisdictions,
such as the deliberative process privilege. 142 Still, it seems likely that many

135. Telephone Interview with SA #6 (Dec. 5, 2005).
136. Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29, 2005).
137. Telephone Interview with SA#IO (Dec. 9, 2005).
138. Telephone Interview with SA #2 (Nov. 29, 2005).
139. Telephone Interview with SA #5 (Dec. 2, 2005).
140. Telephone Interview with SA #12 (Dec. 14, 2005).
141. Telephone Interview with SA #13 (Dec. 15, 2005).
142. For a thorough discussion of the deliberative process privilege, see Weaver & Jones, supra note 132. As
the authors explain, the privilege protects predecisional communications among government officials that make
recommendations or express opinions on legal or policy matters. /d. at 290, 296. The privilege is qualified, and
can be overridden on a showing of sufficient need. /d. at 315-20. The privilege is available to federal
government officials and to state and municipal officials in federal court, and has been recognized by many,
though not all, state courts. See Kirk D. Jensen, Note, The Reasonable Government Official Test: A Proposal for
the Treatment of Factuallnfomwtion Under the Federal Deliberative Process Privilege, 49 DuKE L.J. 561,
561-65 & n.14 ( 1999) (collecting cases and other authority).
Similar to the attorney-client privilege, the deliberative process privilege has been justified on grounds of
instrumental necessity. See, e.g., Michael N. Kennedy, Escaping the Fishbowl: A Proposal to Fortify the
Deliberative Process Privilege, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1769, 1800-01 (2005) ("[T]he basic assumption that people
speak more freely in private than in public is so deeply rooted in our law that it would be odd if such an insight
were not recognized in the context of government deliberations as it is in so many other contexts."); Weaver &
Jones, supra note 132, at 316 ("One would also expect some administrators to be more cautious in their future
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government clients simply are not overly preoccupied about whether the
privilege is available to protect their disclosures.
Regardless of whether their clients expressed concerns about confidentiality,
most attorneys felt that these concerns did not significantly constrain communications with their clients. An attorney from a state with broad open government
laws commented, "There's really not much of a chilling effect. People just kind of
do their job and don't think about things becoming public record." 143 The
observation suggests that in many cases the fact that government employees need
legal advice to "do their job" is sufficient incentive to communicate with lawyers,
regardless of the contours of the privilege. 144 Another attorney, whose state
supreme court had held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply in
litigation between agencies, nonetheless felt that the decision had not made
clients significantly less forthcoming: "In general I think it doesn't make a
difference. It's kind of like putting TV cameras around. For a while people
modify their behavior, but then they forget and go back to what they were doing
before." 145 An attorney who worked in a state where the governor had recently
released an agency memo without seeking permission from the agency nonetheless believed that the incident would not chill communications: "This won't
really affect things. Maybe on the margin people will be a little less willing to
talk, but for the most part, no." 146 On the whole, attorneys stated that their clients
were sufficiently candid with them, and felt that concerns about the privilege did
not conflict with the desire to obtain accurate legal advice through frank
disclosure.
If anything, attorneys felt that their clients become concerned about the
privilege after disclosing something, rather then tempering their candor predisclosure. One state government attorney commented,
I have not ever had someone say to me, I didn't come to you because I thought
someone might get this information later. So I haven't found that our open
government has created obstacles to agencies getting legal advice .... I think
most don't think about it until after the fact, and they say, wow, I wish I hadn't
said that. 147

Another attorney explained that "in many cases, people want the attorney-client
privilege because they just don't want to deal with the consequences. That's just

deliberations [if there were no privilege]."). However, commentators have also aired misgivings about the
viability of the instrumental rationale for the deliberative process privilege. See, e.g., Gerald Wetlaufer,
Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845, 886-88 (1990)
(questioning whether the absence of the privilege would in fact chill communication).
143. Telephone Interview with SA #8 (Dec. 6, 2005).
144. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 498-99.
145. Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30, 2005).
146. Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29, 2005).
147. Telephone Interview with SA#10 (Dec. 9, 2005).
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practical." 148 The concern that a previous statement will become public,
however, does not provide as compelling a justification for the privilege as the
concern that the statement will not be made in the first place, because no chilling
of communication has taken place.
Some attorneys even remarked that they wished their clients were less
forthcoming with information, particularly in the context of electronic communications. One state attorney explained regretfully,
Things are forwarded so easily. I've sent something on email responding to an
email from an agency employee, and they forward it to all the managers, and
then those people forward it to someone. So I don't know how many people it
went out to- it could be in the hands of a hundred people! People think, 'it's
just email.' 149

Another added, "Every once in a while I have to send out a reminder saying,
'please remember to mark this privileged if it's from me.' Another thing is with
email, sometimes people will send me a message and cc, like, seven or eight
people." 150 In such cases, attorneys felt that their clients were not thoughtful
about confidentiality and wished that they would be more circumspect about their
disclosures.
It would be an exaggeration to say that attorneys unanimously agreed that their
clients were willing to be candid regardless of the privilege. One state attorney
felt that,
there are some situations in which clients wouldn't be as frank if the privilege
wasn't there .... One of the problems we have is getting our clients to come to
us before they take action, because so many times folks think all lawyers do is
say no. I think that they will be even more reluctant if it's not confidential. And
I think we would be less effective at serving them. 151

Nonetheless, the same attorney readily acknowledged that his clients "don't have
absolute assurance, because you can't tell what a court is going to do," 152
suggesting that to the extent clients do need the privilege to feel comfortable
disclosing information, the privilege still may not need to be absolute. Another
attorney explained that "for a number of matters that are sensitive or deal with
issues of great importance, people want to know that the communications are
covered" by the privilege. 153 Aside from these two remarks, attorneys did not

148. Telephone Interview with SA#16 (Dec. 20, 2005).
149. Telephone Interview with SA #12 (Dec. 14, 2005).
150. Telephone Interview with SA #10 (Dec. 9, 2005).
151. Telephone Interview with SA#3 (Nov. 29, 2005).
152. /d. (emphasis added).
153. Telephone Interview with SA #9 (Dec. 7, 2005).ln contrast to most other interviewees, this attorney had
been in public practice for less than a year and had previously practiced in the private sector for fourteen years.
She was generally more cautious in her responses than were most other interviewees.
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emphasize the necessity of the privilege.
Some attorneys also admitted difficulty in persuading their clients to disclose
information to them, but attributed this to factors unrelated to uncertainty
regarding the privilege. One attorney, who had worked in a state attorney
general's office for more than twenty years, remarked that "you find that
employees aren't forthcoming if they're not doing the right thing, regardless of
whether there's a privilege." 154 Another attorney, who also had worked in the
public sector for about twenty years, explained that resistance to disclosure
"sometimes comes up with disgruntled employees. Like maybe they're unhappy
with the direction something is going, or with the agency head. So they're less
willing to talk to the attorney, because they think why would I talk to you, you're
the enemy too." 155 Neither of these impediments to candor would be remedied by
an absolute privilege.
At a recent ABA teleconference on Ethics for Government Attorneys, panelist
Patricia Salkin argued strongly in favor of a government attorney-client privilege.
However, she also remarked,
It's common for all different kinds of staff to come in and spill their guts about
vouchers not filled out correctly, about all kinds of potential ethics issues going
on with other people in the office and they think that they can go and tell the
lawyer to clear their conscience and walk out and feel good about it .... 156
Salkin's comment exemplifies an underlying contradiction in the reasoning of
many commentators: if the point of the privilege is to facilitate candor, yet
government employees tend to reveal information even without the privilege,
then what purpose does the privilege serve? The point of the privilege is not
simply to conceal information for the convenience of the government attorney
and her client-if the privilege is to exist, there must be some other policy
rationale for its existence.
In sum, the interviews with government attorneys provide at most limited
support for the instrumental justification for the attorney-client privilege. 157
Some clients do express concern about the privilege, but for the most part,
attorneys indicated that their clients seem to think about the privilege infrequently, if at all. Moreover, the interviews also suggested that for many clients,
154. Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30, 2005).
155. Telephone Interview with SA# 15 (Dec. 19, 2005). An absolute privilege would not make a difference
in this situation because the individual employee would not have control over the assertion of the privilege.
156. Audio CD: Everyday Ethics for Government Attorneys, held by the Am. B. Ass'n Center for Continuing
Legal Educ. (Dec. 16, 2005) (on file with author).
157. It is worth pointing out that the interviews cited in this section have captured lawyers' perceptions of
their clients' disclosure incentives, while the clients themselves might tell a somewhat different story.
Nonetheless, lawyers' opinions on whether their clients are forthcoming still provide valuable information. If an
attorney believes that her client is generally candid, it suggests that, although the client may not always disclose
every last detail, the level of disclosure is sufficient to satisfy the attorney's expectations and does not cause
discernable interference with the representation.
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the existence of the privilege is not determinative of their decision to disclose.
Although the knowledge that a communication is privileged may put clients'
minds at ease, they also seem not to know exactly what the privilege means, or
even to need to know exactly what it means, in order to disclose information.
Not surprisingly, attorneys tend to think about the privilege much more than
their clients do. As one attorney said, "I do think that agency folks don't think in
advance about the privilege. I think attorneys think about it more." 158 However,
attorneys' concerns surrounding the privilege seemed to consist mainly of fear
that an employee would accidentally waive the privilege, thereby revealing
something that would be disadvantageous in litigation. They were less concerned
that the uncertain legal status of the privilege would prevent their clients from
communicating candidly. Indeed, most attorneys' efforts with respect to the
privilege focused on making sure their clients did not inadvertently reveal
privileged information. 159
Perhaps the most accurate conclusion to draw is simply that the importance of
the privilege in facilitating disclosure varies from one employee, agency, or state
to the next. Even this conclusion demonstrates that the instrumental rationale is
less powerful than many commentators have argued. If many clients disclose all
relevant information without regard to whether their conversations are privileged, then for these clients the privilege is superfluous. It prompts no increase in
candor, yet shields communications from exposure, thus resulting in a net
decrease in the amount of information available to the public relative to a world
without the privilege. 160 The exact degree to which the attorney-client privilege
does operate to increase candor among government employees is difficult to
ascertain empirically, but in many cases the increase appears minimal.
2.

QUALITY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The apparent candor of government employees despite the uncertainty of the

158. Telephone Interview with SA #12 (Dec. 14, 2005).
159. For example, one attorney described her efforts as a "continuing education program between us and the
agency." She explained,
Every once in a while I have to send out a reminder saying, 'please remember to mark this privileged
if it's from me.' Another thing is with email, sometimes people will send me a message and cc, like,
seven or eight people. Now, I don't like that-I will reply just to the sender, and remind them that it's
confidential.
Telephone Interview with SA #10 (Dec. 9, 2005). Another attorney explained, "What we try to train our clients
to do is be careful with cc lists, and if they send emails on or forward them, that they have done thoughtful
consideration of who they're sending it do." Telephone Interview with SA #15 (Dec. 19, 2005). A municipal
attorney remarked, "I have to remind people on staff what it [the privilege] is and who it belongs
to ... [S]omeone will want to tell me something, and I have to tell them that I may need to share that with the
city manager and the city council." Telephone Interview with Municipal Attorney ("MA") #2 (Dec. 15, 2005).
160. This contravenes Wigmore's theory of the policy underlying the privilege. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra
note 65, § 2291.
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privilege calls the instrumental necessity of the privilege into question. Still, we
must also consider the ability of government attorneys to provide effective
representation in the face of such uncertainty. It would be undesirable if an
insufficient privilege interferes with government attorneys' ability to advise their
clients or unduly disadvantages the government relative to private parties.
In interviews, government attorneys generally affirmed that they were able to
advise their clients effectively despite the uncertainty of the privilege. Some
reported that they occasionally modified their behavior to avoid creating a
situation where sensitive information would be subject to disclosure, but they did
not report negative consequences from such modification. A thirty-year veteran
of the attorney general's office in a state with expansive public disclosure laws
explained that because everything would become public following the conclusion
of litigation, "if we have something that's particularly sensitive, we don't put it in
writing. Like with witness preparation-we don't say, 'we don't want you to say
this' in writing." 161 Another attorney explained that if she goes to a meeting
where she has not met everyone present, the first thing she does is find out who
everyone is before she begins to talk, and "if there are people there who are not
within the privilege, then I don't have a privileged conversation. I may say, 'I
may need to have a talk with the director later, but here's what I can tell you
today. "' 162
Commentators have questioned whether this sort of behavior modification,
designed to work around a weak area in the government attorney-client privilege,
might prevent attorneys from advising their clients as effectively. 163 One can
certainly envision scenarios in which giving oral rather than written advice, or
delaying advice to a client, might interfere with effective representation.
However, government attorneys described such behavior modification matter-offactly rather than negatively, implying that these adaptations to their working
environment did not actually have a negative impact on their performance. It
seemed that the uncertainty of the privilege sometimes made the attorney's job
more difficult, but attorneys felt that in general this difficulty did not result in less
effective representation for the government client.
Moreover, awareness that information could be revealed sometimes even
produced desirable behavior modification. An attorney from a state that
essentially treated the privilege as nonexistent except in litigation explained,
"Sometimes when private attorneys come in they're startled that we don't have
the privilege. But if it gives us an incentive to provide unfailingly good advice,
then I think that's okay .... It's like a check that keeps you doing good work, the

161. Telephone Interview with SA #8 (Dec. 6, 2005); see also Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30,
2005) ("We try not to put things in memos-we know it will come back to bite us.").
162. Telephone Interview with SA#l5 (Dec. 19, 2005).
163. See, e.g., Ellinwood, supra note 45, at 1320-21.
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knowledge that something could be discoverable. 164 Another attorney could not
recall a time when the privilege had been asserted in his division outside of
litigation. Nevertheless, he said,
In thirty-five years, I never felt constricted in terms of what we wrote. Now
when I carne here, they said to me, if you're prepared to put it on paper, you
better be prepared to announce it from the street comer. But we give the best
advice we can here. 165

These attorneys' comments suggest that, in some cases, the knowledge that
communications might become public helps to ensure that government attorneys
provide high-quality legal advice.
The other major concern relating to the quality of legal representation is that
without a robust government attorney-client privilege, the government will face a
disadvantage in proceedings against private parties. Government attorneys
readily acknowledged that limitations on the privilege presented additional
difficulties, particularly in situations where there were competing interests at
stake. One municipal attorney characterized government representation as "much
more difficult than having private clients" and explained that sometimes city
council members would leak information to acquaintances. 166 Several attorneys
also remarked that certain information was more freely available to the other side
due to state FOIA laws that narrowed the attorney-client privilege. A state
attorney explained, "If you think the other side hasn't produced everything, the
tools to compel them are more limited for us." 167
Although attorneys were forthright about these exigencies, they also felt that
some additional difficulty was inherent in government practice. No attorney
could recall a situation when constraints on the privilege had resulted in
significant disadvantage to the government. Interestingly, some attorneys indicated that, although their litigation opponents in the private sector had far more
access to potentially relevant information, this apparent liability often failed to
materialize in practice because their opponents failed to avail themselves of the

164. Telephone Interview with SA #I (Nov. 22, 2005). He also commented that "I haven't heard any
experienced attorney here complain. I've heard nothing, zippo. I think everybody is comfortable with it."
165. Telephone Interview with SA# II (Dec. 13, 2005).
166. This municipal attorney recalled,
When I was working as an attorney for another community ... we got authorization for a range of
settlements in a personal injury case. But then someone leaked it to the plaintiffs. So when we went to
negotiate, they knew the high end, and that was where they were starting from. It ended up costing us,
like, $150,000. So ... it's a little like litigating with one hand tied behind your back.
Telephone Interview with MA #I (Dec. 1, 2005). Such clearly problematic scenarios might be somewhat more
likely in the municipality context, where a single attorney often represents a city council entity comprising
several elected individuals with divergent interests.
167. Telephone Interview with SA#lO (Dec. 9, 2005).
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broad disclosure provisions affecting government parties. 168
Moreover, even if the government might be slightly disadvantaged relative to
private parties in some circumstances, many attorneys stressed that this was
simply a cost of the openness critical to quality public sector legal representation.
Public scrutiny, they felt, was an integral component of their role. A thirty-five
year veteran of a state attorney general's office stated firmly, "When dealing with
public agencies you want as much disclosure as possible." 169 Another expressed
agreement with a state decision abrogating the privilege in a criminal matter,
explaining, "This is a public agency, and there were public funds involved. It's
really a question of the public interest, and you don't want the attorney-client
privilege to get in the way of that." 170 Even an attorney who analogized
representation of a municipality to "litigating with one hand tied behind your
back" readily agreed that "one has to balance the fact that this is an annoyance in
doing our jobs with the needs of the public for information and this principle of
open government." 171 Thus, according to some government attorneys, a claim
that abrogating the privilege impairs the quality of legal representation overlooks
the contravening benefit of transparency in government.
On the whole, attorneys seemed more concerned about the privilege once
litigation was ongoing or imminent. Even attorneys who were generally content
with a very minimal attorney-client privilege often attached greater importance to
confidentiality once they were actually in litigation, noting the importance of
other protections such as the work product privilege. 172 Provided that there was
adequate protection for conversations undertaken in anticipation of litigation,
attorneys were much less concerned about the abrogation of the privilege. The
priority that attorneys place on shielding litigation preparation from scrutiny is
unsurprising, and given our adversariallegal system, it seems desirable for such
preparation to remain privileged. Thus, the eventual tailoring of the privilege
should provide greater protection for such communication.
C. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY

Discussions with government attorneys suggest that the traditional instrumental rationale cannot justify an absolute attorney-client privilege in all circumstances. In lieu of this traditional understanding, we should look to the wide
variety of authorities that have conveyed a public-spirited vision of the
government attorney's role to guide us in tailoring the privilege appropriately.

168. For example, one attorney remarked, "It's all open, so opposing counsel could ask to see the entire file,
they could ask to see attorney work product from a different case that is similar. But it doesn't happen."
Telephone Interview with SA #8 (Dec. 6, 2005).
169. Telephone Interview with SA #11 (Dec. 13, 2005).
170. Telephone Interview with SA# 12 (Dec. 14, 2005).
171. Telephone Interview with MA#1 (Dec. 1, 2005).
172. Telephone Interview with SA #I (Nov. 22, 2005).
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This brief subsection cannot fully explore the nuances of the government
attorney's role, nor will it attempt to delineate the proper scope of the privilege.
Instead, I hope to highlight these issues as important areas for further research.
Various legal authorities have hinted that the government attorney has a special
set of responsibilities. In Berger v. United States, the Supreme Court explained:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. 173

While Berger specifically addressed the duties of prosecutors, many lower court
decisions have echoed its sentiments when discussing government attorneys
more generally 174-as have a number of respected legal commentators. 175 The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct also support the idea that government
attorneys have a unique responsibility to act for the public good. The comment to
Model Rule 1.13 explains, "a government lawyer may have authority under
applicable law to question [government officials'] conduct more extensively"
than would a lawyer for a private organization. 176 As a result, "a different balance
may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the
wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved." 177 In some
situations, government attorneys even represent the general public in a more
literal sense: for example, in the system of referendums and initiatives employed
by twenty-four states, government attorneys have primary responsibility for
defending enacted measures against legal challenge. 178
This public-spirited conception of the government attorney's role is mirrored
173. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
174. See, e.g., Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("As officers of this court,
counsel have an obligation to ensure that the tribunal is aware of significant events that may bear directly on the
outcome of litigation .... This is especially true for government attorneys, who have special responsibilities to
both this court and the public at large.").
175. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should and Will Government
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 789 (2000) ("It is an uncontroversial proposition in
mainstream American legal thought that government lawyers have greater responsibilities to pursue the
common good or the public interest than their counterparts in private practice .... "); Douglas Letter,
Lawyering and Judging on Behalf of the United States: All I Ask is fora Little Respect, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1295, 1297 (1993) ("In theory, federal public servants have a single master: the people of the United States.");
Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, A Proposed Right of Conscience for Government Attorneys, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 311,
313-14 (2003) (explaining the government attorney's special responsibilities); Elisa Ugarte, The Government
Lawyer and the Common Good, 40 S. TEx. L. REv. 269, 274 (1999) (citing the government lawyer's "obligation
as a public servant"); Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV.
L. REv. 1170, 1192 (2002) (citing a "strong moral intuition that government attorneys should bear some
responsibility for considering public values").
176. MODEL RULES R. 1.13 cmt. 9.
177. MODEL RULES R. 1.13 crnt. 9.
178. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA #7.
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by the attitudes of government attorneys themselves. In the interviews I
conducted, attorneys almost universally agreed that their role was different from
that of private attorneys because a concern for the public interest informed all of
their decisions. 179 Their awareness of this public responsibility sometimes caused
them to alter their behavior in a variety of ways to further what they viewed as the
public good. One attorney explained,
We will be far less aggressive in objecting at a hearing when a public employee
is being questioned. The idea is that this is a public employee and he should
have to explain himself. Even if opposing counsel is asking fifty questions, and
some of it is moving a little bit into something that is probably privileged, we
will let it continue. 180

Similarly, some attorneys explained that in certain situations they voluntarily
disclose information that might be privileged. A state attorney recalled a situation
involving the regulation of charities, for which the attorney general's office is
solely responsible: "We went ahead and opened up all the files on the matter, and
decided not to assert the privilege, although we could have .... But if it's more
appropriate and more fair to the people of the state, then in our office, we can
make that determination." 181 An attorney who had worked in government for
twenty-two years spoke for many of his colleagues when he commented, "Our
mantra is that what we do is for the benefit of the people ... Unlike private
attorneys, we don't zealously represent clients." 182
All this evidence suggests that government attorneys do not have the unilateral
responsibility to their clients that private attorneys do. Although government
attorneys do advocate forcefully for the positions of the government officers and

179. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with SA #I (Nov. 22, 2005) ("Our mantra is that what we do is for the
benefit of the people."); Telephone Interview with SA #2 (Nov. 29, 2005) ("I think that while my responsibility
is to the agency, I also have a responsibility to the [attorney general's] office which defends the entire state. So I
have a broader client."); Telephone Interview with SA #3 (Nov. 29, 2005) ("We've got to play fair all the time.
Even when our clients want us to have four rows of teeth, we have to remember that we represent the state. We
can't play hardball even when we want to."); Telephone Interview with SA #4 (Nov. 30, 2005) ("You are
providing a vigorous defense, but you also have to look at the public good. And part of that is looking at the
whole public picture."); Telephone Interview with SA #7 (Dec. 5, 2005) ("[Representing the government] is
really quite different, because in representing the agencies, you also represent the state of [redacted]. You have
to think about what is good for the state, and good for the way government works .... There is this sense of
public service."). Telephone Interview with SA #8 (Dec. 6, 2005) ("Other times it's more where you act as an
advisor to the agency, like you say, have you considered the impact on the taxpayers, or on the public fisc. The
agency may say, we just want this issue to go away, and I'll say, this is going to make a bad precedent, or to be a
bad thing for the other agencies, or something."). Nearly every government attorney discussed the idea of
serving the public interest without prompting.
180. Telephone Interview with SA #7 (Dec. 5, 2005).
181. Telephone Interview with SA #17 (Jan. 20, 2006).
182. Telephone Interview with SA #1 (Nov. 22, 2005); see also Telephone Interview with SA #15 (Dec. 15,
2005) ("I think it's very suspicious when an agency does something to hide something that would otherwise be
public. There's this question of the public interest, and basic principles of democracy. If there's no public policy
reason to invoke the privilege, why would you?").
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agencies that they represent, their responsibility to the general public is always in
the background and at times affects the manner in which they represent their
clients.
Courts have suggested that these broad concerns of public interest and justice
come to bear in delineating the extent of a privilege. For example, in United
States v. Arthur Young & Company, the court declined to create a privilege for an
accountant's work product on the grounds that an independent auditor such as a
public accountant "assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client." 183 The Court explained that the public accountant
"owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders as well
as to the investing public. This 'public watchdog' function demands that the
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires
complete fidelity to the public trust." 184 There are important differences between
an accountant and an attorney for the government. Still, the Court's emphasis on
the accountant's public responsibilities demonstrates that the public interest is an
important concern in determining the extent of a privilege.
Ultimately, this Note does not attempt to formulate the exact circumstances
under which the attorney-client privilege protects communications between
government officers and their attorneys. However, conversations with practicing
government attorneys indicate that the instrumental justification carries far less
weight than it has traditionally been assigned. Consequently, we must look
elsewhere for guidance in sculpting the contours of the government attorneyclient privilege. An array of authority suggests that the paramount responsibility
of the government attorney is to work for the public interest, and it is with the
public-spirited values of governmental transparency and openness in mind that
courts should attempt to craft a suitable tailoring of the privilege.

V.

CONCLUSION

The most commonly cited rationale for the attorney-client privilege is
instrumental: the privilege is necessary to facilitate candid communication
between clients and attorneys. However, in the government entity context, this
justification falls short. The protection afforded by the privilege is already
uncertain, due to various open government provisions and political and media
pressures, yet government employees continue to communicate with sufficient
candor to allow government attorneys to provide effective representation.
Thus, a more limited version of the attorney-client privilege is appropriate for
the public sector, and my hope is that future research will elaborate on the shape
the privilege should take. Courts, commentators, ethical canons, and attorneys
themselves have noted the unique responsibility of the government attorney to
183. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984)(emphasis in original).
184. /d. at 818.
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serve not only the government entity she represents, but also the public interest.
Ultimately, defining the privilege with this obligation in mind will best facilitate
the important democratic values of transparency and openness in government.

